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SOCIOLOGY 
G. W. C. ROSS 
The College of St. Thomas, St. Paul 
Equal Protection of the Laws 
The above phrase, which furnishes the title for this paper, 
occurs in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States constitution. The Amendment is long, divided into five sections; 
only the first two, however, will be of immediate concern. Section 1 
defines who shall be regarded as citizens, and then proceeds to say 
that "No State shall ... abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens ... , nor ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without clue process of law, nor deny to any person ... the equal 
protection of the laws." One election day, a few years after adoption 
of the Amendment, a Missouri woman appeared at the polls to vote. 
Her vote being refused by the local election officials, she brought 
suit which she carried through the . United States Supreme Court 
[Minor vs. Happersett ( 1875): 21 Wall. ( 88 U.S.) 162.]. Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, she argued, had made her a citizen 
and a voter. Obviously her victory in the case would have established 
woman's suffrage at one bound as law throughout the country, 
making any later enactment of the Nineteenth Amendrnent needless. 
But the Court denied her entire contention in toto. The Amendment 
had not made Mrs. Minor a citizen, said the Court; because she was 
a citizen already, and remained so. The amendment had made negroes 
citizens, specifically in order to overrule Chief Justice Taney's pro-
nouncement in the Dred Scott Case [ ( 1857) : 19 Howard, 393], that 
no negro could be a citizen of the United States, not even a free 
negro. But while the Fourteenth Amendment did make the negroes 
citizens, it did not make them voters. That required the later enact-
ment of the Fifteenth Amendment. Moreover, section 2 of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment provides for reducing the representation in 
Congress of any state that disfranchises any part of its adult male 
citizens. That plainly indicates a state's right to do that very thing 
if it cares to pay the price. And section 2 makes it still clearer that 
section 1 did not intend to make women voters; for it required reduc-
tion of representation only of states that should disfranchise part of 
their adult male citizens. 
So in 1892 Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the unanimous 
bench of the United States Supreme Court, laid it clown again that 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not refer to the elective 
franchise" [McPherson vs. Blacker 146 U. S. l] TI1ere is indeed a 
profound difference in the underlying ideology of the Constitution 
regarding the right to vote ( and hold office) on the one hand, and 
what we think of as the "civil rights" of personal liberty. The latter 
the Constitution looks upon as rights which it did not confer upon 
us, because we already had them. The Constitution simply recognized 
and confirmed them. Note the wording of the Ninth Amendment: 
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The 
key word here is "retained". But the right to vote is a "political" right, 
a right conferred by law. Thus when section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment refers to citizens, it means their "privileges or im-
munities." A privilege precisely is a right conferred upon some, but 
. not upon all. Everybody knows that at the time the Constitution was 
adopted and for quite a while afterwards the right to vote in general 
( and speaking a bit loosely) was confined to landowners and other 
taxpayers. It was not until the "Jacksonian Era" that what is thought 
of as "universal suffrage" swept the country. And then it ·was not, 
and is not, truly universal, neither in terms of citizens nor of persons. 
Children are citizens and persons, but they are not qualified voters. 
Nobody-adult or child, man or woman, white or black, Christian or 
atheist, citizen or alien-is · a voter unless he has been made so by 
affirmative provision of law. 
A book recently published on the Congressional history of the 
formulation of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that in the debates 
it was well understood that the "equal protection" provision would 
not qualify anyone as a voter, a fact which made section 2 of the 
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Amendment seem needful.1 In the Amendment the "equal protection" 
guaranty is closely coupled with the more famous "due process" 
provision. The background of this latter is easily traced. It stands 
in the English Petition of Right ( 1628), and in different wording it is 
expressed in Chapter 39 of Magna Carta. But none of the great 
constitutional documents of English history contains a guaranty of 
"equal protection," nor was it put into our own original Constitution, 
although, of course, a general notion of equality before the law is 
nothing new. It goes back at least to the Stoic thinkers of antiquity, 
and aside from the glaring exception of slavery, it became a general 
principle of the positive law in the later Roman Empire. Later in 
the ringing phrases of the Declaration of Independence Jefferson 
affirmed his faith that it was a "self-evident truth" that "men are 
created equal". 
The writer has not undertaken to explore the historica1 develop-
ment of the locution "equal protection of the laws", for this paper is 
not intended as a comprehensive inquiry into the whole scope and 
ramifications of the provision, but is confined to the question of its 
bearing-or lack of bearing-upon the right to vote. 35 years after the 
decision of McPherson vs. Blacker, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking also 
for the unanimous bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Nixon 
vs. Herndon (273 U. S. 536), held that a Texas statute to exclude 
negroes from voting in the Democratic Party primaries was uncon-
stitutional precisely because it denied to negroes the equal protection . 
of the laws. Exegetically and historically the statement is certainly 
wrong. How then did a man of Holmes' profound scholarship come 
to make it? Justice Holmes in general did not favor broad or loose 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of his most-quoted 
statements stands in his dissenting opinion in the case of Baldwin 
vs. Missouri [(1930): 281 U. S. 586]. "I have not yet adequately 
expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the increasing scope 
given to the 14th Amendment. As the decisions now stand I see hardly 
any limit but the sky to the invalidating of state statutes if they 
happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason unde-
sirable." 
1James, Joseph B. 1956. The framing of the fourteenth amendment. University 
of Illinois Press. Champaign-Urbana. (Especially Chapter 6:) 
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It is believed the explanation may not be far to seek In ·earlier 
cases the Supreme Court had held that the control over elections 
which the Constitution gives to Congress (in Article I, section 4) 
did not apply to the process of nominating candidates even when 
conducted through "direct" primary electio_ns, because political parties 
were not agencies of the states to which the legal and constitutional 
requirements for the general elections could apply, but were merely 
voluntary private associations which had every right to pick and 
choose their members for themselves. So on the face of the prece-
dents Holmes was not in a position to say that the Texas primary 
statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment. That he would have liked 
to say that is more than a merely plausible conjecture; in fact, about 
15 years later the Court did overrule those earlier precedents and 
held explicitly that the Fifteenth Amendment does apply to 
primary elections [U. S. vs. Classic (1941), 313. U. S. 299; cf. Smith 
vs. Allwright (1944): 321 U. S. 649]. But in 1927 Holmes likely found 
the time not yet ripe for converting his colleagues to that point of 
view; yet beyond doubt he felt very deeply that the voting rights 
of negroes should not be restricted. It may be remembered he had 
been a Union soldier and was an intensely patriotic nationalist. 
Dying a childless widower he left most of his estate to The United 
States of America. 2 And so in Nixon vs. Herndon he seized on the 
Fourteenth Amendment. "We find it unnecessary to consider the 
Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems hard to imagine a more 
direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth. That Amendment 
denied to any state the power to withhold from negroes the equal 
protection of the laws". It may be remarked- that Holmes therein did 
exactly what he had excoriated in Baldwin vs. Missouri-he stretched 
the Fourteenth Amendment out of shape in order to avoid a result 
he deemed undesirable. 
In a few later dissenting opm10ns Justice Holmes' aberration 
has been echoed. Michigan had been electing its 14 Presidential 
Electors "at large"; that is, all on a single state-wide ticket, so that 
each voter had the right to vote for all the state's Presidential Electors. 
But in the 1880's Michigan· passed a statute by which the state 
2Bowen, Catherine Drinker. 1943. Yankee from Olym.pus. Atlantic Monthly Press. 
Boston. 
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,vas to be districted so that each voter would be able to vote for 
only two of the state's Presidential Electors. The case of McPherson 
vs. Blacker was brought "to contest the validity of that revision. The 
plaintiffs argued that it denied to Michigan voters the equal protec-
tion of the laws by denyiµg to each a right to vote for the whole 
body of the state's Presidential Electors. It was to rebut that con-
tention that Chief Justice Fuller ruled that section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "does not refer to the elective franchise." He added the 
reminder that the Constitution does not require even that the Presi-
dential Electors shall be elected by popular vote at all. The Consti-
tution's word is "appoint"-"each State shall appoint" its Presidential 
Electors "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." And 
the Legislature, noted Chief Justice Fuller, "might itself exercise 
the power of appointment", as in fact most state legislatures did 
during the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century and as South 
Carolina's legislature continued to do till the Civil War. Nor could 
the fact that public opinion had gradually brought all the States 
to · a uniform system of popular election by single statewide ticket 
"weaken the constitutional autonomy of each State." There was, as 
noted above, no dissent expressed. For Congressional representation 
Illinois had redistricted itself following the 1900 Census, never 
since then. After the 1940 Census voters in overpopulated, hence 
underrepresented districts brought suit to forbid the governor and 
other state officials to continue to hold Congressional elections 
according to the old, unreconstructed districts. But the United States 
Supreme Court refused to interfere [Colegrove vs. Green (1946), .328 
U. S. 549]. The question, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the Court, 
counts on a "wrong by Illinois as a polity," and is not for the courts. 
"Congress," he continued, "can deal effectively with the situation if 
it cares to. It has exclusive authority to secure fair representation by 
the States in the House of Representatives." But in this case :Mr. 
-Justice Black, together with Justices Douglas and :Murphy dissented, 
insisting that the old, out-of-date and now out of proportion district-
ing denied equal protection of the laws to the underrepresented 
voters of Illinois and also abridged the· privileges and immunities of 
citizens, a point of view lifted directly from Mr. Justice Holmes' 
pronouncement in Nixon vs. Herndon. vVhat does "equal protection 
of the laws" mean, he had inquired rhetorically in that opinion, except 
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that "the law shall be the same for the black as well as for the 
white?" This was a still more egregious fallacy, for whatever the 
phrase under our microscope here may be taken to mean, it does not 
and cannot mean that every person's legal rights and obligations 
must be the same as every other person's. Childrens' rights and 
obligations are not those of an adult; children, for example, have 
not the right to control their own conduct as an adult has. On the 
other hand, children do have one right that adults do not enjoy, 
to wit, the right to break their promises; a childs' promise cannot 
be enforced against him in court. The law in very truth is stuffed 
full of statements of rights and obligations differently applied to 
particular groups of persons. Nor does the "equal protection" clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment run at all in terms simply of persons 
of different races or colors, but in the universal terms of "any 
person." 
So by per curiam opm10n the Supreme Court has lately held 
that a state law may provide that a newly-formed political party shall 
be entitled to a place on the official ballot only pursuant to a 
petition signed by at least 25,000 voters, of whom at least 200 must 
live in each of 50 named counties of the State, which contains 102 
counties in all. But here too Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy 
dissented again, explicitly on the ground that such inequality 
amongst voters denied them the equal protection of the laws 
[McDougal vs. Green (1948): 335_ U. S. 281]. 
Minnesota readers will appreciate the timely relevance of this 
paper to our own legislative reapportionment problem, If Justice 
Douglas, Black and Murphy-and Holmes-are to be believed, the 
membership of our present Minnesota Legislature denies to our 
voters their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws-
but then so does the United States Senate itself, and so does the 
Presidential Electoral College_ 
Chief Justice Fuller was right-section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not refer to the elective franchise, 
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